People work for the deal thesis, the hold period, and the exit.

A sponsor brought us in three weeks before an IC presentation to conduct people due diligence on a mid-market business services acquisition. The financial model had been constructed around the existing management team and their client relationships, and the deal thesis depended heavily on leadership continuity through the first two years of the hold period. No structured people review had featured in the diligence process to that point.

The review identified three material findings. The CFO had handed in his notice six weeks earlier, a fact that had not emerged through the financial diligence workstream. Two of the four senior leaders had change-of-control provisions in their contracts that would crystallise on completion and create an immediate cash obligation the model did not account for. And a historical employment tribunal settlement, resolved without admission but with confidentiality provisions, created a reputational exposure the buyer needed to understand before signing.

Findings were presented to the deal team and legal advisers with a recommended commercial response for each. The CFO departure was factored into the retention structure for completion. The change-of-control costs were reflected in the adjusted commercial terms. The historical matter was disclosed to the buyer's legal team with appropriate context, and the risk was managed rather than concealed.

The deal completed on a revised timeline. The sponsor's assessment was that none of the findings would have prevented the transaction, but all of them would have been substantially more expensive to discover after signing.

Eight months into a hold period, the portco's VCP metrics were not tracking and the management team had begun attributing the shortfall to market conditions. The sponsor brought us in to determine whether the business had an execution problem or a structural one, and to make a recommendation before the first formal review with their LP advisory committee.

The operating model diagnostic identified a structural mismatch. The business had grown by roughly 40 per cent since the last formal organisation design work, but the reporting architecture had not been updated to reflect that growth. Regional general managers were carrying spans of control that made active management impractical, and the decisions that drove the highest-value client relationships were being made too far from the people with the authority to act on them. The VCP's commercial growth assumptions had been built on execution capacity the current structure could not reliably deliver.

The engagement redesigned the operating model around the three growth levers the VCP identified as primary: client relationship depth, new logo acquisition, and margin improvement through delivery efficiency. Reporting lines were restructured, a new layer of operational accountability was introduced at the business unit level, and the leadership population work ran alongside the structural changes rather than following them.

VCP metrics began recovering in the quarter following implementation. The sponsor's board pack for the LP advisory review carried a credible narrative about the operational changes and their anticipated effect on the trajectory, rather than a revised set of market-adjusted projections.

A sponsor preparing a portco for a formal sale process brought us in twelve months ahead of the anticipated launch date, recognising that the people and employment position would receive close scrutiny from financial buyers and that unresolved issues would affect either the timeline or the achievable valuation. The instruction was to identify and address anything that would give a diligent buyer cause to reduce price or require indemnities.

The review identified four distinct risk areas. Succession clarity below the CEO was thin, with no documented capability assessment or contingency for the two operationally critical roles. A number of historical employee relations cases had been closed administratively but not formally resolved, leaving residual questions about any outstanding claims. Employment contract documentation across the senior population was inconsistent, with several individuals operating on terms that did not accurately reflect their current responsibilities or compensation arrangements. And key-person concentration in the client base was higher than management had appreciated, creating a risk profile that buyers would price conservatively.

Each category was addressed in sequence over the twelve-month window. Succession documentation was produced, capability assessments were completed, and two internal promotions were made to broaden the visible leadership bench. Historical employee relations matters were formally closed with appropriate documentation. Employment contracts were audited and updated across the affected population. And the client relationship coverage was extended through a structured programme of secondary relationship development, so that no individual held sole contact with accounts above a defined revenue threshold.

The vendor due diligence process completed without material people-related findings. The sale proceeded on the original timeline, and the sponsor avoided the pricing adjustment that unresolved people risk had created in a comparable transaction in their portfolio two years earlier.